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Abstract 
Using language requires simultaneously verifying communication and the linguistic message of the 
speaker. There is, therefore, an emphasis on understanding, which is contained in the linguistic message. 
Understand goes beyond what is said, and includes the immediate connotations, that is, semantics in the 
strict sense. Language must, therefore, be interpreted, though it is indeed transferred by the immediate 
meanings of the linguistic code. In the present paper, the authors approached some of these issues from 
the point of view of the hermeneutics of spoken or written language, as a double proposal (ostensive and 
estimative) of the subject in relation to his reality 
 
Keywords: Connotative significance, Denotative significance, Ethic, Estimative propositions, 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Language, values and ideologies have been studied throughout the history of 
philosophy. However, as an Italian cyberneticist Silvio Ceccato (1961) pointed out, 
when adults looked at reality they didn’t notice that the concept of reality had been 
established in childhood and so was assumed. Following this insight, certain attempts to 
model language focussed on the mental operations involved in making meaning 
(Glasersfeld, 1972). In the present paper a number of approaches to language values and 
ideology are reviewed with the aim of developing a mathematical basis for modelling 
these dimensions of meaning. Our intention is to develop a model that is consistent with 
radical constructivism following Ernst von Glasersfeld (1995), however we note that 
many of the sources reviewed here assumed relating ideas to reality was unproblematic 
but whose contribution to this domain remains significant.  
 
From the 19th century, discussions of the origin and the historical development of 
language by Herder and Humboldt were the “narrative” of the modern and postmodern 
disciplines of linguistics and the psychology of language, i.e., thinking about language. 
Aristotle’s metaphysical argument on the importance of substance in understanding 
being is redividus in 20th century Logical Atomism. The essence of this theory is to 
practice logically perfect language (e.g. subject, predicate sentences, fact stating 
sentences, theory of types. Logic is the study of influence in reasoning as reasoning is 
carried on in language to analyze various kinds of inference. The validity or lack of 
validity in an argument largely depends on the form of the statements in which the 
argument is presented. Epistemology becomes concerned with language at a number of 
points, especially prominent is the problem of a priori knowledge. We have a priori 
knowledge when we know something to be the case on some basis other than our 
experience. Mathematics is one form of this type of knowledge. The existence of a 
priori knowledge has always been a problem for empiricists.  
Verbal discussion is the chief tool of the philosopher, and there are various arguments 
against language. Advocates of mystical intuition, notably Plotinus and Bergson, have 
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considered language to be unsuitable for formulation of truth; however access to truth is 
intuitively felt or experienced via language forms. Language acquisition of children 
requires more than simple empirical explanation. So it makes sense to ask if ordinary 
language is sufficient for philosophical purposes. The later Wittgenstein seems to have 
held that key philosophical problems arise from the fact that philosophers have misused 
certain key terms such as “know,” “see,” “free,” and “reason.” Thus, they have become 
entangled in insolvable puzzles over whether we can know what other people are 
thinking or feeling and whether we can ever really see physical objects. Note that here 
we are on the way to a post-modern denial of access to “authorial intentionality.” (e.g., 
Rorty, Fish, Layotard, Quine, Bernstein, etc.).  
Are issues about the adequacy of ordinary language for philosophical purposes due to 
language’s vagueness, ambiguity, context dependence and inexplicitness? These issues 
are expressed in the work of Leibnitz, Russell and Carnap. To these men mathematics is 
the only medium where linguistic defects are overcome. These authors say that there is 
nothing in one language that one cannot say in any other. Postmodern critics claim that 
Western culture derives from Aristotle, so Logic and Geometry are purely Western 
constructions.  
Considerable work in Modern and Post Modern philosophies is based on “Conceptual 
Analysis”. When conceptual analysis criticises concepts of causality, the very rationality 
of the discussion arises. Is language analysis adequate as a tool for the whole of 
philosophy? What is the relationship of the philosophy of language to the theory of 
knowledge? What is the meaning of any word? Is there any difference between the 
statement, “I know” and “I believe?” The need for a functioning methodology for 
semantic investigation makes it inevitable that analytical philosophers turn their 
attention to problems of the philosophy of language. Some semantic problems that are 
prominent are: 
 
1) What is it for a linguistic expression to have a certain meaning? 
2)  Under what conditions do two or more linguistic expressions have the same 
meaning?  
3) Under what conditions are we justified in saying that a word has two different 
senses in two different given contexts?  
4) What are the conditions under which the meaning of an expression may be more or 
less vague?  
5) What is the difference between a literal and a figurative use of a term?  
6) What kind of meanings are there? For e.g., is there a difference between cognitive 
and emotive meaning?  
7) What does it mean to “know?”  
8) What is the relation between the structure of language and the structure of whatever 
it is used to specify?  
9) What are the varieties and interrelations of linguistic acts and uses of language?  
10) What are the specific features of the language of religion, poetry, normal discourse, 
advertisement, misinformation, lying under oath, etc.?  
11) What are the specific features of different kinds of expression, e.g., proper names 
and definite description (e.g., difference between description and explanation)? 
  
If we have sufficient basis to infer that language is just a codification of a system of 
signs that represents experienced reality and, hence in the final analysis cannot have a 
one-to-one correspondence with this experienced reality, then we cannot doubt that 
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language turns out to be information and an expression of the speaker. And this is 
independent of the truth value contained in propositions. The three terms Beauty, 
Goodness, Truth (kalon, agathou, aletheia) form a separate subgroup within the general 
family of Platonic transcendental ideas and their development can be considered 
separately. Of these three, truth is most closely associated with the topic of this paper 
and depends solely on propositions. There are two rival theories: correspondence and 
coherence.  For correspondence theory, truth is a relational property involving a specific 
relation to some portion of experienced reality. For Russell (1912, 129): “Thus a belief 
is true when there is a corresponding fact, and is false when there is no corresponding 
fact”. Bertrand Russell explained the correspondence theory elegantly and to sum up the 
theory, it simply states that a belief, statement, or proposition is true if and only if it 
corresponds with facts (Russell 1912, 119-130). For instance, the statement ‘Russell 
wrote the Problems of Philosophy’ is true if and only if it is indeed the case (a fact) that 
Russell wrote the problems of philosophy. Even though truth-values apply to 
propositions and beliefs, it also depends on the experienced world. Russell gives the 
following example, “Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio.” In that sentence 
there are two relations. The first one, there is a relation between Desdemona and Cassio 
that is tied by love. Then, there is the relation between Othello and complex relation 
signified by the belief. Now, in order for Othello’s belief to be true, complex relation 
(Desdemona loves Cassio) must be a fact. The belief is false if complex relation is not a 
fact. Russell’s correspondence theory is considered to be a realist account because 
Russell argues that even though truth and falsity apply to beliefs and propositions, truth 
is still dependent on how reality really is. It depends on facts that are mind and language 
independent. For instance, the statement “Russell wrote the problems of philosophy” is 
true if and only if it is indeed the case (a fact) that Russell wrote the problems of 
philosophy and that fact is independent of language and mind.The authors have adopted 
a modified theory of correspondence in which following the insights of radical 
constructivism, we recognize that we cannot get beyond experience to check reality 
itself, rather we make the best intersubjective viable model of experience.  
 
2. FORMALIZED AND NATURAL LANGUAGES 
 
Personal use of language, that constitutes speech, is subject to language rules as a 
system and to a constant dynamism and fluency with continuous generation of 
grammatical forms. If speech were to abide by grammar and the prearranged lexicon, 
the limitations of our communication possibilities would be such that would lead to 
depersonalization. There would be an overwhelming similarity in our spoken language. 
The variation in grammatical form possible in everyday language becomes a multiplier 
of expressive and informative possibilities for the subject, and ultimately, is a source of 
our forms of verbal behavior, that are structured by grammar to present any actual 
contribution. Structural linguistics and generative grammar focus on one dynamic and 
functional grammar. 
If any grammar problem arises in order to build a logical syntax the speech will 
naturally be edited, unless it becomes a form of unusual colloquial speech. But in this 
case, the use of grammar is not too helpful either, since logic and grammar do not have 
to be in concert. But if speech is interesting as an expression of the speaker and as a 
possible source of analysis of specified attitudes, then unusual speech is shown to be 
extremely useful. As Otero (1989) says "linguistics of the future may well be called 
upon to be a general theory of human intelligence and its products, and will have to 
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give in some way a reason for the difference in nature between an aberrant sentence 
(e.g. "being tired has feathers") and a false sentence (e.g. "two plus two equals seven'). 
If natural language would serve effectively to denote experienced reality on a one to one 
relationship, the function of grammar would lie in making possible the verbal 
formulation of real processes as accurately and faithfully as possible. But if the two 
systems are not isomorphic but are heterologous systems then linguistic analysis will be 
more appropriate for categorizing a corpus of language than natural language grammar. 
Wittgenstein put it this way: "An expression has meaning only in the stream of life"1. 
For the denotation of experienced reality is precisely other language, formalized 
language. The main task of language is subordinate  to experienced facts and their 
relationships. The logical syntax of language (Carnap, 1942) is a field of linguistic 
research which ignores language users and the designate of linguistic expressions; a 
theory that is not concerned with the meanings of the terms, but with the classes and 
hierarchies of symbols that form such expressions. If formalized language, with which it 
would be possible to express relationships within the context of previously defined 
speech, is not useful for operational use, than it seems contradictory that a grammar, 
starting from natural language, should try to give the speech the same status as language 
using categorical crystallized forms (Russell, 1948).The fundamental issue, therefore, 
should move from an emphasis on the grammatical categories of parts of speech, to a 
semantic analysis of syntactic behavior. When Whitehead (1979) wondered if his 
perception of green is a denotation of reality (green in certain reality) he probably 
ignores that green is a designation that is absent in some natural languages such as 
Korean. We could bring up here to emphasize the importance of the radical 
constructivist perspective also the known discrepancies between the denotations and 
connotations of colors between the Welsh and the Danes, or the number of words that 
the Japanese have to designate "wind". 
Language as system turns out to embody unwanted but necessary contractions of 
communication possibilities. Or in other words: language itself limits its functions, its 
operability. For this reason, Quine (1960) recognized, when dealing with translation that 
indeterminacy also affects the problem of the reality of objects specified by any term. 
To verify the accuracy of a lexeme from their translation into another language it is 
imperative to recognize the reference made in the native language. Hence, the semantics 
of the reference only make sense if it is oriented toward the original language, i.e., if it 
is studied from the original statement (Quine, 1960). No cannot understand the intended 
meaning of a proposition – as reference - other than from standing within the context in 
which this proposition was given. If it is possible to construct rules to understand the 
context, then academic grammar is of little use. 
 
3. INFORMATION AND EXPRESSIVENESS 
 
The operation prior to the detection of a meaning of denotative significance is the 
expressive or informative categorization of this significance. In fact, in talking one 
refers to an object. This object is called the designatum or referent in the usual theory of 
meaning. The significant issued for the receiver are of two types: director significant A 
(Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2014a,b; Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 
2012) and indirect or significant B (ibid). It may be that the direct significant concerns 
                                                          
1Ein Ausdruck hat nurim Strome des Lebens Bedeutung. 
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an experienced external object (when referring to something or someone), or an internal 
object (when referring to himself). In any case, also there is a dialectic opposition 
between both significants. Then: 
 
Hypothesis 1: If one speaks directly about an experienced external object, one speaks 
directly about this object; if one speaks directly about oneself, the external components 
are indirectly alluded. 
 
Urban (1951) divides communication acts into two main categories: acts that 
communicate with a certain behavior or an emotional state (behavioral communication), 
and acts that confer some knowledge or a mental state (intelligible communication). 
Ogden and Richards (1989) established the basic distinction between referential terms 
(or symbolic), i.e., alluding to the referent, and emotive terms. Morris (1946) in turn 
divided communication into identifiers and designators on one hand, and appreciators 
and specifiers on the other. The thesis of the double denotative significance (d-s), 
expressive and informative, confers possibilities that are characteristic of 
communication. However, this duplex structure of language is not always noticed by the 
receiver, not even by the sender. Thus, the sender may be unaware of the expressive part 
of what is communicated and believes that he was only reporting. At the same time, for 
the receiver, there is always or almost always a plus in this expressed but unnoticed part 
of the communication. But in our judgment; we do not consider these two forms of 
communication, informative and expressive, as independent. In general, it can be 
thought that the surface structure of any communication corresponds to the informative 
message and the deep structure to the expressive content. But this is not always the case. 
In fact, it often happens that propositions have a fundamentally expressive intention 
rather than intending to conceal information. For example, cases where this occurs 
directly conceal the emotion of the sender from the receiver, which is typical of populist 
political messages. In any case, between information and expression there is a 
dialectical opposition, under which lies the denotative significances as equipollent 
formations. Then: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Higher expressive content implies lower information content. Higher 
information content implies lower expressiveness. 
 
So sometimes what is reported includes the hidden structure of communication, while in 
others it is the expressive content that is hidden under the guise of what is reported. 
 
Definition 1: The informative denotative significance (d-s)i is defined as that 
significance concerning the proposed referent. 
 
Note 1: (d-s)i is independent of any referent that is an experienced external object or 
person speaking. 
 
. A proposition with informative denotative significance is defined by the meaning 
intended.  
 
Example 1: The following propositions are (d-s)i: 
1) P1 = I’m sad 
2) P2 = This painting I find beautiful 
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3) P3 = This notebook has a red cover 
 
Definition 2: The expressive denotative significance (d-s)x is defined as that 
significance, intentionally alluding to the subject of the proposition, without the subject 
himself being at that time in the referent of the proposition. 
 
Note 2: (d-s)x are denotative significances not consciously referring to the subject of the 
proposition. 
 
Note 3: (d-s)x not to be roughly confused with judgments about the referent; as long as 
the subject of the proposition is aware of its verification as such, the value judgment is a 
(d-s)x. 
 
Example 2: The following propositions are (d-s)x: 
1) P1 = John's behavior is unbearable 
2) P2 = Willows seem to me melancholic2 
3) P3 = Willows are melancholic3 
 
In summary, we can say that: 
 
1) (d-s)i are descriptions, whatever the object, external or internal. 
 
2) (d-s)x are self-references, hidden behind the apparent description of the object or 
referent. 
 
 
Let (d-s)x be the expressive denotative significance, and (d-s)i be the informative 
denotative significance. Let (c-s)x be the expressive connotative significance and (c-s)i 
be the informative connotative significance. We will use a special formula as a fraction 
where the numerator is the denotative significances and the connotative significances 
the denominator. We will represent the two possible cases: 
 
1) Case 1: Expressive denotative significance appears in the foreground as surface 
structure, while informative denotative significance constitutes the deep 
structure. 
( )
( )
( )
( ) 





−
−






−
−
i
x
i
x
sc
sc
sd
sd
 (1) 
 
                                                          
2 In the proposition Willows seem to me melancholic, the speaker noted that the value judgment is 
subjective, not a Willow property, so that this proposition is constituted as informative about the speaker, 
not the willows. 
3 The proposition Willows are melancholic, seems to refer to the willows, when in fact it expresses 
something about the speaker, although that is not the intention. In it the subject of the proposition aims to 
inform about the willow, when in fact it only expresses the speaker’s feeling. 
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2) Case 2: Informative denotative significance is in the foreground, absorbing 
almost all the expressive denotative significance. 
 
( )
( )
( )
( ) 





−
−






−
−
x
i
x
i
sc
sc
sd
sd
 (2) 
 
 
Example3:   For case 1, P = well, I think ... I do not know ... come, I think it's normal. 
For case 2, P = I do not think this is right at all. 
 
Specific analyses of propositions lead us to extensional formulations, representing poli-
propositional chains (PC) which are enunciated. Then:  
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
n
i
x
i
x
i
x
i
x
n
i
x
i
x
i
x
i
x
sc
sc
sc
sc
sc
sc
sc
sc
sd
sd
sd
sd
sd
sd
sd
sd
PC






−
−






−
−






−
−






−
−






−
−






−
−






−
−






−
−
=
..,,.........,,
...,,.........,,
321
321
 (3) 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
n
x
i
x
i
x
i
x
i
n
x
i
x
i
x
i
x
i
sc
sc
sc
sc
sc
sc
sc
sc
sd
sd
sd
sd
sd
sd
sd
sd
PC






−
−






−
−






−
−






−
−






−
−






−
−






−
−






−
−
=
,.......,,,
,.......,,,
321
321
  (4) 
 
Thus, expressive or informative denotative significance corresponds to their connotative 
significances, of one kind or another. 
 
Example 4: Let's take as an example of our work the attitude of the subject in front of a 
painting (Figure 1) 
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Figure 1: Clotilde in evening dress (Joaquin Sorolla4) 
 
Here is a description of this picture: This is a woman sitting in an armchair, with one 
hand on her hip and the other holding a pendant. Her eyes look focused.  On one of the 
arms of the armchair hangs a shawl. There seems to be a screen behind the armchair. 
In this chain of propositions or rather descriptions there appears to be no more than the 
surface structure consisting of the information provided. From the quantum of seen and 
unseen reality little can be inferred about the subject's attitude towards the object. 
In general, any incorrect or partial reality constitutes an expressive denotative 
significance of an informative proposition. 
Now consider another description of the same picture: This is a woman who is sad, 
thoughtful, and does not know what to do with the pendant. Her eyes are melancholic. 
She is disoriented in her life. 
None of the partial propositions adduced are categorically informative, except for the 
reference to "this is a woman". However, the subject, with all the additional content, 
creates and provides information on the woman in the picture. But really, all he does is 
projects onto the object of the picture his own attitudes, and consequently what is 
expressed is his own subjectivity. 
The significance of making a polipropositional chain, each part in turn capable of 
isolation, offers the obvious advantage of making changes in the formalization of 
phrases in the categories of expressive and informative communication. Returning to 
the example of figure 1: in the series of following propositions: Well ... this is, how 
                                                          
4Joaquín Sorolla y Bastida (27 February 1863 – 10 August 1923) was a Valencian Spanish painter. 
Sorolla excelled in the painting of portraits, landscapes, and monumental works of social and historical 
themes. His most typical works are characterized by a dexterous representation of the people and 
landscape under the sunlight of his native land. 
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would say I? ...., a portrait of a woman as absent. Performing a propositional analysis 
we would have: 
 
1) ( ) Wellsd x =−
1  
2) ( ) isthissd i =−
1  
3) ( ) ?2 Isaywouldhowsd x =−  
4) ( ) womanaofportraitAsd i =−
2  
5) ( ) absentassd x =−
3  
Let⊕  be the operation of propositional addition. Then: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )sdsdsdsdsd xixixPC −−−−−= ⊕⊕⊕⊕
32211  (5) 
 
Definition 3: We define total range R of a propositional chain, as the number of 
denotative significances of the chain. 
 
The previous propositional chain has a total range R = 5.  
 
Definition 4: We define partial range as the number of expressive (RE) or informative 
(RI) denotative significances of a propositional chain. 
 
In the former case the partial expressive range is RE = 3 and the partial informative 
range RI = 2. 
 
Definition 5: A propositional chain will be consistent if the denotative significances 
maintain the same informative and expressive partial ranges over a certain part of the 
speech. Otherwise, we say that it is inconsistent. 
 
Thus we can distinguish between expressive or informative consistency (or 
inconsistency) in a given speech. By way of example we will point out two cases of 
inconsistency very common in speech. 
 
1) The case of a person whose speech is shown to be consistent with a certain 
listener and inconsistent to another, to the extent that the latter creates an 
inhibitory and difficult situation. This manner of speech is very often exploited 
by leaders of certain movements, both political and religious. 
 
2) Most people can display consistent speech in the context of very varied contents, 
and at one point, display more or less inconsistency. In such cases, the speaker 
appears inhibited in communicating, and the speech becomes highly expressive, 
and does not seem able to give complete expression like the earlier consistent 
communication. 
 
This schematic representation of the propositional chain allows observing the existence 
of blockingsof (d-s)x or (d-s)i, that sometimes occur from the beginning, and sometimes 
in the course of the spoken chain. The consideration of blockages shows that the deep 
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structure of speech does not necessarily correspond to (d-s)x, but other times, what is 
hidden are all sorts of (d-s)i. 
It is often the case with a speech that begins with a propositional chain of expressive 
significances, switches suddenly the whole structure of the speech and introduces a 
chain of informative significances. Consider another subject before the painting of the 
figure 1. His message is: Yes ..., that is ..., maybe I am being foolish ... I do not know ... 
well ... this is the portrait of a woman dressed formally. "Well" is a verified formal 
speech inflection, and what follows gains in grammaticality and information. 
 
Definition 6: Those lexemes, which indicate speech, change from expressive denotative 
significance to informative or vice versa, we will call speech inflection points. 
 
In the above case we have: 
 
1) Expressive propositional chain = [Yes ..., that is ..., maybe I am being foolish ... I 
do not know ...] 
2) Speech inflection point = [well ...] 
3) Informative propositional chain = [this is the portrait of a woman dressed to be 
formal] 
 
It is important in propositional analysis to detect when inflection of significance 
categories occurs. 
 
4. OSTENSIVE AND ESTIMATIVE PROPOSITIONS 
 
Let PC be a chain of propositions such that wPPPPPC ⊕⊕⊕⊕= ....321 .  
 
Definition 7: Each of the propositions that form the chain PC we will name partial 
propositions and will be denoted as Pp. 
 
Definition 8: Each partial proposition will be assigned a truth value V, such that the 
value will be 1 if the proposition is true and 0 if false. 
Then: 
 
( )
( ) falseifPV
trueifPV
p
p
0
1
=
=
 (6) 
4.1. Ostensive propositions 
There is a category of lexemes and, in general, meaning units that play an ostensive 
function (Nescolarde-Selva, Usó-Doménech and Gash, 2013), which are extensions of 
ostension itself, i.e., simple signage. For Quine (1960), these lexemes are extensions of 
demonstrative pronouns "this", "that", etc. 
 
Definition 9: These lexemes that function as verbal pointers of referents, and are 
located in experienced reality or imagination, as well as external to the speaker, are 
called ostensives. 
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Ostensive significances have ostensive meaning iff they allude to an external referent, 
that is, if they make a proposition such as: "it is true than for A this is p".  
 
Note 4: Therefore, for ostensive propositions (OP) we apply the principle of verification 
in its strict formulation since they are empirical propositions. 
 
Note 5: Ostensive propositions are synthetic judgments and, as stated, are apophantic5. 
 
What connotes an ostensive proposition is the situation of the speaker with respect to 
the referent, or the nature of his apprehension, qualitatively or quantitatively, to the 
reality that in that moment is a referent. The generic meaning of ostensive propositions 
is as follows: 
 
1) The existence of the object serves as a reference. It is the categorization, as the 
real process of the content of the proposition; in this case the content is an 
ostensor or indicator. 
2) The form of apprehension of what is considered real. 
 
Therefore, ostensive propositions connote: 
1) Anything that somehow refers to the sender’s conception of reality. 
2) The way in which the sender (speaker) is close to what he considers as real. 
 
Ostensive propositions are therefore true or false, as they correspond to the referent that 
they cause. Then, for a given context: 
 
( )
( ) falseifOPV
trueifOPV
0
1
=
=
 (7) 
Example 5: Consider the ostensive proposition OP = the woman is sitting in an 
armchair. V(OP) = 1 iff the woman is sitting in an armchair, i.e., if it is tautological. 
 
From a logical point of view we say that an ostensive proposition has ostensiveness 
regardless of its truth value. 
 
4.1.1. True ostensive propositions 
True ostensive propositions (OPV) provide a specific way, a significance with respect to 
the sender: what thing or things of reality are denoted. From the fact of the denotation 
of the thing the sender becomes visible, within the set of processes of reality. The 
propositions cannot be conceived as emerging spontaneously, but must be imagined as a 
result of the stimulus-response relationship. Therefore, the nature of the response allows 
one to infer the selectivity identified by the subject of the proposition within the set of 
perceptual stimuli received. 
 
                                                          
5Apophantic is a term Aristotle coined to mean a specific type of declaratory statement that when 
examined itself can determine the truth or falsity of a logical proposition or phenomenon. It was adopted 
by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger as part of phenomenology. Marcuse defines it as "the logic of 
judgment". 
po
st-
pri
nt 
Co
rre
sp
on
din
g a
uth
or:
 jo
su
e.s
elv
a@
ua
.es
 
12 
 
Example 6: Consider the ostensive proposition OPV = she is a woman who is here 
sitting, alone. This proposition not only refers to the perceived and denoted, but also 
what is not described (armchair, shawl, pendant, screen, etc...). The immediate 
connotation is: between perceived realities, the one that takes human form is especially 
enticing for him, the nonhuman details remain to be grasped. 
 
In true ostensive propositions (OPV) one is interested in, apart from its total character 
(OPV)T  or partial character(OPV)P, the following: 
 
a) The content of what makes up a real and true percept. 
b) The content of what ceases to be a percept, despite being located in the same 
perceptual field. 
 
Example 7: Consider that facing same painting an individual issued the following chain 
of propositions: PC = (OPV)T   = a seated woman,  dressed in black ... and a shawl ... 
and there is also as a screen. We divide this into partial propositions: 
(OPV)P1 = a seated woman  
(OPV)P2 = dressed in black 
(OPV)P3 = and a shawl 
(OPV)P4 = and there is also as a screen 
They tell us about the way the person appends the form of the referent. There is no link 
between the propositions. The subject is approaching reality in a way that is not global, 
but rather, from the beginning, punctiform (Figure 2). 
 
                                                     PC 
 
 
 
                            
                          OG 
                                                                    
                                                     EG (Elided) 
 
 
 
 
                                                                (OPV)P1     (OPV)P2       (OPV)P3         (OPV)P4 
 
Figure 2: Tree diagram of the proposition of Example 7.EG is the elided group 
OG is the sentence group 
 
True ostensive propositions (OPV) provide information on the object or referent: 
expressed in the form of interest about the object. For total true ostensive propositions 
(OPV)T the information about the referent is pretty exhaustive, one that barely has a 
place for expressive significance, except the connotation of being a subject capable of 
apprehending this part of reality. However, an objective relationship with a plot of 
reality does not guarantee objective relations to other plots. Therefore, from (OPV)T we 
can only infer that the reference field referred to is not a cause of conflict. 
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In partially true ostensive propositions (OPV)P revealing the preferential and the optional 
on certain aspects of reality allows us to connote certain transfers on that plot that are 
selected and that others are overlooked. 
 
4.1.2. False ostensive propositions 
A false proposition ostensive remains ostensive, insofar as the sender gives it the quality 
of ostensiveness because of its function. 
 
Example 8: Consider the proposition OP = the woman is in the presence of God. It is a 
false ostensive and the character of the speaker is clear from the formulation, but it is 
quite unverifiable. 
 
Ogden and Richards (1989) argue that the best test for determining whether a 
proposition is symbolic is that one could answer whether it was true or false. False 
ostensive propositions pose a more complex problem. They do not have the same range 
if falsification comes from an observable referent or if they allude to an unobservable 
referent. 
 
Example 9: Consider an isolated old mansion; sinister-looking on a stormy night. It is 
home to two subjects. Suddenly there is a clatter on the glass of a window on the first 
floor. To S1 "it is the rubbing of the branch of a tree on the glass of the window due to 
the wind". To S2 "it is a vampire who wants to come in". Consider that S1 is impeded 
and cannot go upstairs. The most plausible reason is that he cannot verify the ostensive, 
and consider whether it was in fact false, and there is no tree branch. Certainly, these are 
two different ways of falsifying. For S1 nevertheless, he can argue that is in the plane of 
the observable. For S2, there is a slide towards the unobservable level. Various 
connotative significances are possible for both types of false ostensive, but they are not 
as different as it seems at first. Note that S1 has had the option to say: 
a) Is it a tree branch? 
b) Can it be a tree branch? 
among other propositions. The declarative nature of the proposition has been given on 
an observable referent but it is not verifiable. Consider that S had the option to leave 
things as they are, that is, to the mere verbal encoding of extralinguistic process, such 
as:"is a noise up there”, that would be the only ostensive legitimate proposition. 
 
From overcompensation we can derive dogmatic attitudes very similar to those inherent 
in subjects able to build false ostensives by appealing to unobservable referents, such as 
gods, vampires or ghosts. Although experience confirmed the veracity of the ostensive 
proposition, given as true for a not verifiable referent, which would have modified 
previously deducted connotations. 
 
Total false ostensive propositions (OPF)T are connotatively inhibitory for a referent, in a 
way that incapacitates the subject for objective apprehension in his context. 
 
Example 10: Consider the proposition “this, ... I do not know .... I do not know what 
this is ... I cannot say anything”. 
 
Propositions like the above do not cease to be ostensive by being in the negative. They 
denote a disability in awareness of the apprehension of the real, despite repeated efforts 
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to capture reality. Partial false ostensive propositions (OPF)P denote a sectorial 
apprehension mode of apprehending a totality, and secondly, connote through obtained 
falsifiability. 
 
Example 11: Consider a subject face the painting of Sorolla. “Here's a woman ... what 
is this? ..., this is an old cloth ... it seems right? Thinking there.... What I see is what I 
say.” 
 
 
The following diagram (Table 1) summarizes the foregoing ostensive propositions. 
 
TABLE 1 
Characteristics of ostensive propositions 
PROPOSITIONS OSTENSIVES (OP) 
True Total  (OPV)T are objective relations 
to the total referent, leaving 
the proposition or 
propositions verbalized. 
True Partial   (OPV)P are objective relations 
with partial reference and 
hiding object relations on the 
perceived and unperceived. 
False Total (OPF)T is object relations with 
the object reference, and 
subsequent inability for the 
apprehension of that object. 
Conflict situation regarding 
the object and the system of 
connotative significances that 
imply the object. 
False Partial   (OPF)P connotes inability for 
total apprehension of reality. 
Falsifiability on apprehended 
sectorial reality, consecutive 
to relationship with the 
referent object, as a symbolic 
expression of an underlying 
conflict. 
Blockages Connote an inability to simply 
face reality. 
 
4.2. Estimative propositions 
The analysis of estimative propositions (EP) is of great interest, because they show the 
bending or transforming that the subject apprehending reality is forced to verify to 
merge or distance them from that reality (Nescolarde-Selva, Usó-Doménech and Gash, 
2013). An estimation or valuation is, for its protagonist, his projection on the referent. A 
referent is said to be beautiful or ugly, good or bad, etc. But the important thing is 
whether the sender is aware or not of the projective character of the process that takes 
place. In other words, if at any time in the process and for all estimation processes, is 
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there an awareness or not that this estimation is a projection of the subject on the 
referent? Then: 
 
1) Indicate in a direct way which sectors of reality the subject behaves knowingly 
that value judgments are made. In this case we have value judgments. We 
classify this as (EPV). 
2) Indicate on which other sectors the subject behaves inconsistently in applying 
his own appreciations on a referent. In this case, we have prejudices or false 
value judgments. We classify this as (EPF). 
 
Both judgments and prejudices reflect, in principle, on the referrer or sender. Imagine 
the real expression of a subject emitter, as the estimation process supposes derepression 
by the perceived reality that he values, or alternatively put, the attribution of value on 
any perceived reality enhances accordingly the subject’s appreciation of this view of 
reality. The verbal formulation of our values, value judgments or prejudices, is somewhat of a hiatus in internal censorship-though primarily that comes from outside-censorship6.  
If we compare OP (ostensive propositions) and EP (estimative propositions), we see 
that OP, to denote the object, allows a disguising or hiding the sender while something 
is indicated verbally. In EP the subject is given in the reference and he is not hidden. 
 
Note 6: Estimative propositions are apodictic propositions7. 
 
All EP are connotative. They are situated in the plane of denotation, in order to 
broadcast information. But do not be fooled by the linear nature of speech, spoken or 
written. Not taking into account the different categories of sememes, gives the illusion 
that language is presented as linear and extensive in a single direction8. This is not so, 
unless the proposition is ostensive.But the interference of EP in moving to what is 
implicit in the verbal function, composed intentionality, is to be regarded as directed to 
both the referent object and the referrer or speaker. 
 
                                                          
6"Politically correct language" is a sibylline form of internal censorship, "suggested" (imposed) by 
members of the ruling political class. So, saying what we feel is a particular form of freedom. The 
resignation to "be free in what I think" is, of course, a poor aspiration. 
7Apodictic or apodeictic (capable of demonstration) is an adjectival expression from Aristotelian 
philosophy that refers to propositions that are demonstrable, that are necessarily or self-evidently the case 
or that, conversely, are impossible. Apodicticity is the corresponding abstract noun, referring to logical 
certainty. Apodictic propositions contrast with assertoric propositions, which merely assert that something 
is (or is not) the case, and with problematic propositions, which assert only the possibility of something 
being true. For instance, "Two plus two equals four" is apodictic. "Barcelona is larger than Valencia" is 
assertoric. In Aristotelian logic, "apodictic" is opposed to "dialectic," as scientific proof is opposed to 
probable reasoning. Kant contrasts "apodictic" with "problematic" and "assertoric" in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. 
8A sememe is a proposed unit of transmitted or intended meaning; it is atomic or indivisible. A sememe 
can be the meaning expressed by a morpheme, such as the English pluralizing morpheme -s, which 
carries the sememic feature [+ plural]. 
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Example 12: Consider that a subject says: this is the painting of a mature woman, tired, 
embittered and sad. Generally, we tend to consider everything spoken at the denotative 
level. But the EP happens to be connotations of the OP (a woman) and denotations 
reflect on the speaker. So ultimately they are connotative significances. This would be 
clear if the proposition had been emitted in two phases: This is the painting of a woman. 
And then we wanted to find out the connotations of "a woman" for the speaker, who has 
been silent about the picture after issuing the OP. We could ask what does that woman 
mean to you - and get the following answer: a person already mature, tired, embittered 
and sad. 
 
The following diagram (Table 2) summarizes the foregoing of estimative propositions: 
 
TABLE 2 
Characteristics of estimative propositions 
PROPOSITIONS ESTIMATIVES  (EP) 
True Total EPVt are objective relations synchronous 
with the object and himself, that is, value 
judgments that affect the whole of his 
reality. 
True Partial EPVp are sectorial value judgments about 
himself and the parcels of experienced 
reality in which they appear. 
False Total EPFt are totalizing trend prejudices and 
reveal false consciousness of the subject-
object and secondarily, of the object and of 
himself. 
False Partial EPFt connote the existence of prejudice on 
sectors of experienced reality to which the 
subject is unable to take an experienced 
intersubjective reality. 
Blockages Connote an inhibition of the subject from 
experienced reality as a whole. The 
distancing, the impossibility of fusion with 
the object is expressed in the form of “not-
worth it”. 
 
 
4.2.1. True estimative propositions 
In (EPV) the subject is aware that the qualities of the referent are "transferred" from 
him, as sender, to the object, and that the referent itself does not possess these qualities. 
Therefore, it is a bending or transformation of the subject himself; because of this, once 
carried out the judgment in fact is the verification of the referent. This means that when 
a subject performs an EP, he shows an awareness of his experience of reality and so 
acknowledges the subjectivity of valuation. 
True estimative propositions are as in the following example: 
 
Example 13: (EPV) = Bach is I think the best musician (or the musician that I like 
most). (EPV) = Goya is for me the best painter. (EPV) = This building I find beautiful. 
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(EPV) denote the speaker’s awareness about the subjectivity of all value, and also the 
purely expressive role that it possesses.These propositions communicate the emotional 
states of the listener, that otherwise would be inane compared to what happens in the 
interior of the speaking subject. It is no coincidence that subjects adopt colloquial 
language that is almost formalized, purely indicative for these propositions are careful 
to avoid any analysis of them. The result is that the continued habit of non-spontaneous 
speech, indicates only the external character of the values rather than their deeper 
meaning. 
 
4.2.2. False estimative propositions 
In the false estimative propositions (EPF) the sender confers to referent qualities his 
apprehensions and fears. This maybe indicative of a paranoid dynamism, since 
connotative significance is given to a referent that does not possess it, which is just the 
subject’s connotation, but has been externalized to the object, in a fantastic manner 
beyond the subject’s awareness. 
False estimative propositions (EPF) are as in the following example: 
 
Example 14: (EPF) = The willow is sad. (EPF) = Wagner is strident. (EPF) =This 
garden is beautiful. 
 
Therefore, there is a consciousness of experienced reality that is disturbed by the 
addition of properties to the referent that do not concern it. This disturbance is due to a 
lack of self-consciousness about the subjectivity of the valuation. 
There are times when an (EPF) is followed by an (EPV), denoting a correction process 
that the sender executes on himself, further complicating the whole process. 
 
Example 15: Consider a subject facing Sorolla’s painting. This is the portrait of a sad 
woman ..., well, I say she can be sad. 
 
Let’s considering what differences we can establish between (EPV) and (EPF)? (EPV) 
enables initiating communication. We will see this clearly in the following example: 
 
Example 16: Consider a conversation between two subjects. The first S1 proposes: I 
think that conservatives solved the economic crisis (EPV). And S2 responds: Well, I do 
not. I think they will not (EPV). Both are making connotations for themselves to the 
political and economic situation as a form of self-identity. In any case, communication 
is accomplished and notoriously, could continue, as long as they are kept under the 
same canon. Simply talk to each other reciprocally; noting their experiential differences, 
that is an expression of the reality of their respective differentiation. But suppose a third 
man S3 states: Conservatives are the most prepared (EPF). Given this proposition, these 
two responses can fit: Conservatives are not well prepared (EPF), or Conservatives are 
well prepared for you (EPV). Then communication is broken in the sense that a new 
interpretation is introduced. 
 
Consider (EP) where no discussion is possible: On (EPV) it is possible to communicate 
opinions, whereas with (EPF) it is only possible to have conflicting opinions. (EPF) 
involves inflicting a hiatus in the communicative function; this is not useful for 
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communication because its function cannot be fulfilled, which does not contradict the 
fact that it is highly connotative for any subject that uses this form of speech9. 
 
(EPF) denotes unconsciousness of the speaker regarding the subjectivity of any value or 
false consciousness of objectivity of all value. Their internal insecurity compels them to 
evade any flexible interpretation of reality, implying that flexibility is not amongst the 
properties reality may possess. In extreme cases speakers are willing to reject the 
conventional character of every denomination that is not theirs, and are ready to give 
existence to all that they choose to name10. From another perspective, this is clearly a 
false consciousness of reality. They need an unchangeable reality, where they have a 
timeless and ahistorical place, described with abstract nouns such as purity, beauty, 
justice, etc. These values are absolute, and indeed they are the bearers of these same 
values. Values are not mere moods, but the qualities that are inherent in things. Internal 
insecurity may be hyper illusory and if so may be compensated for by building a safe, 
stable and hierarchical world. This insecurity is expressive and may imply a connotative 
rejection of experienced reality, which is then replaced by a fantastic new constructed 
reality. Hence the (EPF) property of outsourcing i.e., projected outside the subject, and 
imposed on the personal reality, is then uncorrectable. (EPF) involves a distorted 
interpretation that cannot be abandoned because it satisfies profound insecurity. This is 
the cause of the incorrigibility of prejudice. 
 
4.2.3. Order of estimative propositions 
Bending moments of estimative propositions are summarized in the following table 
(table 3): 
 
TABLE 3 
Bending moments of estimative propositions. 
 
Steps True Estimative EPV False estimative EPF 
1 The referent (absolute being) is 
perceived. 
The referent (absolute being) is 
perceived. 
2 It is noted what the reference 
is. 
It is noted what the reference is. 
3 It is denoted. It is denoted. 
4 The reference image is valued. The reference image is valued 
without consciousness of being this 
image. 
5 The verified valuation is 
connoted. 
The verified valuation is connoted as 
referent. 
6 The connotation of the 
reference image and the 
evaluation of the image are 
given in concert to the receiver. 
The supposed connotation of the 
subject and its valuation, as alleged 
ownership of the referent, are offered 
in concert to the receiver. 
                                                          
9Experience shows that the discussion of (EPF) is totally barren. 
10Correlation between the number of (EPF) and ignorance is testable. 
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Estimative propositions have different values according to the order that they appear in 
the propositional sequence. 
 
1) An initial EP is most likely an EPF contributing to the OP that are to come. 
 
Example 17: This is awful, it is an old woman. The painting of an old woman. 
 
EPT
F
 OP FT
OPF
T
 
2) A medial EP is almost always true. 
 
Example 18: The painting of a woman, who appears to be sad, isn’t it? ... I see 
it as sad. 
 
OPT
F
 EP VT
EP V
T
 
3) A terminal EP is usually true or false depending on the truth or falsity of the 
ostensive OP. 
 
Example 19:This is a woman, the painting of a woman, with slanted eyes 
looking tired, hair a little out of place, small nose, I think she has one eyebrow a 
little higher than other ... Of course she is ugly. 
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OPT
F
 EP FT
OPF
T
OPP
V OPP
V
EPFP EPFP OPFP EPVP EPFP
The qualification of a PC as true or false has to be done carefully, and with due regard 
to its value (in the Saussirian sense of the term) in context. And this is because the 
speech experience, experience on the interpretation of the other of our speech, has 
brought subtle learning expression mechanisms, making it possible to maintain caution. 
It can be said, very measured sentences often have more biased content, and in this 
sense diplomatic language, or Vatican language, are interesting examples of expression 
control. 
 
4.2.4. Values of veracity 
 
Proposition 1: All propositional chains have a truth value which is a real number 
comprised within the range [ ].1,0  
 
Proof 
Let PC be a propositional chain, VP be the partial true proposition, FP  be the partial 
false proposition, n be the number of partial true propositions and m be number of 
partial falsepropositions. Then: 
 
( ) ( )
[ ]1,0)( 1 1 ∈
+
+
=
∑ ∑
= =
mn
PVPV
PCV
n
i
m
i
i
F
i
V
 
 
 
Example 20: We consider the propositional chain of Example 19. We divide the chain 
in partial propositions such that: 
 
( ) =1PvOP This is a woman,  
( ) =2PVOP the painting of a woman  
( ) =3PFEP with slanting eyes looking tired 
( ) =4PFEP hair a little out of placed,  
( ) =5PFOP small nose,  
( ) =6PvEP I think she has one eyebrow a little higher than the other 
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( ) =7PFEP Of course she is ugly 
 
Then: 
( )( ) 11 =PvOPV  
( )( ) 12 =PvOPV  
( )( ) 03 =PFEPV  
( )( ) 04 =PFEPV  
( )( ) 05 =PFOPV  
( )( ) 16 =PVEPV  
( )( ) 07 =PFEPV  
 
( ) ( )
[ ]1,0.....428.0
7
3)( 1 1 ∈==
+
+
=
∑ ∑
= =
mn
PVPV
PCV
n
i
m
i
i
F
i
V
 
 
Having a fuzzy truth poses a problem: when can we say that propositional chains are 
true or false; completely true or false; or partly true or false? 
 
5. VALUES AND LANGUAGE  
 
Definition 10 (Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012): Values are mental 
constructions in the mind of the Subject generated by specific forms of conduct due to 
the actions conducted by a certain group of people, tribe, nation or culture. 
 
For Luhmann (1985) if one can speak of "morality" in the social system, this expression 
refers to a set of pure conventions (values): The totality of the conditions which this 
system uses to make estimations of reprobation. In our approach to social systems there 
are two superstructures (Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2013a,b, Usó-Doménech 
and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012): 
 
1) A concrete specific Superstructure formed by diverse belief systems: ideologies, 
values in fact, philosophy, sciences, etc. We will call this Superstructure the 
Doxical Superstructure (DS).  
2) An abstract ideal Superstructure formed by ideal values, myths, utopia, etc., 
serving as the primogenetic explanation and the ultimate goal in this structural 
base. We will call this Superstructure the Mythical Superstructure (MS) 
(Nescolarde-Selva, Usó-Doménech and Lloret-Climent, 2014). 
 
We summarized these ideas in the following diagram (Figure 3): 
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Doxical Superstructure 
 (DS) 
Values in fact, Dominant Ideology, 
Culture: Science, Art, Folk beliefs, etc.
Primigenial Base (PB) 
 Ideal Values, Myths.
connotative-SB- projection 
(materialization)Subject
mythical superstructural 
image (MS-image)
Ideal Structure (ISt) 
  Ideal Values, Utopia (Goals)
doxical superstructural 
image (denotative-DS-image). 
denotative-MS-projection
Mythical Superstructure (MS)
Structural Base
Figure 3: Structures and Superstructures of social systems 
 
For example, the imperative norm "Thou shalt not kill" expresses the value for life, 
"Thou shalt not steal" expresses the value for property, etc. LeShan and Margenau 
(1982) call these values values in fact, because they are automatically born of 
considerations, either as an image or reflection of the structural base in the Doxical 
superstructure, and do have not innate nor outside obligatory validity except for 
conformity with the imperative norms that are arbitrary to a great extent. Considering 
the values in themselves, it is not possible to know if their structural antecedents, the 
imperative norms, are valid. Values more frequently describe the majority conduct of 
the group of actor subjects; the practice is taken as a norm. It is thought that determined 
actions or behaviors are correct if the majority accepts them. This deceit is common and 
pernicious and lasts until this normative structure changes. Values in fact lack 
normative force (projection of Doxical Superstructure on Structural Base).  Being 
merely in fact needs to be "should have it". That the "to be" reaches "must be" is 
through ethical validity. Nevertheless, the added value of the validity supposes the 
establishment of correspondences with another series of values called ideal values (in 
the Mythical Superstructure). All normative structures belonging to the Structural Base 
contain, in addition to norms and their reflection in the Doxical Superstructure in types 
of values in fact, a series of goals that are the ideal values reflecting the Doxical 
Superstructure on the Mythical Superstructure. These ideal values are practically 
accepted in almost all cultures: they contain principles on personal and collective human 
happiness, freedom of action and beliefs, the right to life, health, tranquility, peace, 
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privacy, certain conjugal fidelity rights, education, etc.  These ideal values include 
"Human rights". In spite of the variety of their names, the values are compatible. The 
correspondence between values in fact and ideal values, the added value of happiness, 
freedom, etc., by mediation of a life in agreement with these forms of order, are taken to 
give validity to the Doxical Superstructure, transforming values in fact into norms, by 
mediation of a projection of the Doxical Superstructure to the Structural Base.  
The hermeneutical study of estimative propositions leads to a disturbing hypothesis: the 
impossibility of objective ethics and aesthetics. An objectivist theory of values, either 
ethical or aesthetic, argues that these are properties of referents, whether observable or 
unobservable. However, the thesis of the objectivity of values is a sample of the 
verbalistic fallacy, where to be is not taken as the copulative verb, but as a symbol of 
identity, or at least of equivalence. The proposition "x is good" is equal to "x has the 
property of being good." The objectivist thesis is also called the naturalistic fallacy. By 
contrast, the subjectivist theory of values, maintains the thesis that value is a subject 
property verifying the proposition about the object. There is no denying the existence of 
values, much less their operational nature, but trying to show the subjective its nature, 
and understanding values belong to the subject or subjects is a difficult task. 
 
Example 21: Consider the proposition this picture is beautiful. It is an estimative 
proposition, or attributive, regardless of what is shared uniquely or unanimously. 
 
Propositions of this kind are inferences drawn directly from an OP (about this picture), 
and here lies the incorrect logic. Since if the estimative propositions are denotations of 
the subject about the proposition, then we are forbidden to make inferences from an OP 
that belongs to a different experienced object of reality. In the false valuation, in 
considering the value as the property of the object, the subject obtains the value as an 
OP, such as in the following example: 
 
Example 22: This picture is a portrait, pink and black colors are dominant, consisting 
of a figure, etc.. and beautiful. It is noted that the last proposition is presented as an 
(OPV)P, when it is an (EPF)P. 
 
In summary, we can say that for large OPs that are provided for a referent, the inference 
of an EP is not permitted, because an EP no longer belongs to the referent object but to 
the speaker of the proposition, which is another object. The amount of denotations we 
do on a referent X does not allow transfer to the referent Y, simply because they are 
different referents. 
In the EP, i.e., the values, the referent is the referrer. Let x be a referent and f(x) be a 
function. Let ו be an operator such that וx(f(x)) meaning that x is the referent that 
satisfies a certain function. 
 
Example 23: Consider the following proposition P = Moms are selfless. וx(f(x)) reads 
like the x Moms are meeting the function f (x) to be selfless. What procedure is there to 
discuss the truth or falsity of the predicate of the proposition P = Moms are selfless? Let 
S be a subject (referrer). As the proposition is issued and expressed: /S∀ וx(f(x)), i.e., 
for all Subject-Moms are selfless. But if formulated: it is the case that there is at least a 
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subject for which Moms are selfless, then /S∃ וx(f(x)). Their truth values are 
respectively: V( /S∀ וx(f(x))) = 0 and V( /S∃ וx(f(x))) = 1.  
 
There is no denying the existence of value. The value exists as property of the subject 
being valued. The truth makes sense for the emitter of the proposition, not for the 
subject of the sentence. The second propositional form is called existential. This 
demonstrates the subjective nature of every evaluative proposition and thus, the 
subjective nature of any value involved in any kind of propositions that contain it. 
 
A system of propositions EP is thus a system of OP regarding the referrer who 
therefore can build a system of referential value of their ideology. The value system 
connotes directly about the ethics and aesthetics of the subject or group, but does not 
make it possible to build an ethics or aesthetics of generic rank, beyond any historical, 
cultural and personal relativism. An ethics or aesthetics which it is intended to confer an 
ahistorical absolute and timeless category, demonstrates the non-theoretical, doctrinal 
approach of those that support it, and in any case requires interpretation through 
recourse to economics, sociology and social and individual psychology. Its 
interpretation leads to the system of connotations’ of the subject of the proposition 
which happen to be comparable to the intrasubjective or extrasubjective motivations of 
the subject. 
 
6. LANGUAGE AND IDEOLOGY 
 
Is necessary to ask the following: what is the mechanism that makes it possible to 
consider value as the property of an experienced object? For the authors, this is due to 
different learning processes that take place in the subject-object relationship: 
 
1) The verbalist fallacy: One learned the use of words and academic categorizations 
in total dissociation from their logical categories. The child learns to denote the 
objects with which he interacts and knows the use of denotations to allude to 
both visible and invisible referents, and importantly both subjective and 
intersubjective denotations. Thus, the child acquires the illusion that the words 
are the objects they designate. In addition, if the words function, the qualities 
they denote are taken to be as real as the objects to which the word refers. The 
magical power given to words, especially nouns, resides then in the idea that 
words can conjure up objects. What the child and the adult also often do is think 
that the way they think about objects and other phenomena in their experience is 
that there is only one way to think about these objects and phenomena.  
2) Intentional learning: the valuation procedure of words beyond their denotative 
range is facilitated by adults who often emphasise the right way of feeling 
thinking and so on as though there was only one perspective. so, the child is 
constantly confronted with value judgments he cannot validate objectively, but 
which are presented as statements of fact. "This is good" and "that is bad" are 
offered to the child just as in saying "this is red" and "that is green." Such 
submissions become part of “socialized reality", which is one reason why many 
adults (some great philosophers too) do not accept the logical difference 
between the moral imperative and the affirmation of fact. The child is made to 
learn that there are values per se, as a way to facilitate their integration into the 
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group holding these values. Having achieved the autonomy of that learning, 
there is a tendency to keep valuing, individually, because group membership is 
closely associated with sharing values. Prejudice is a sort of conservation: a 
cognitive invariance. We think that social conservations of this type are related 
to self-identity and their expression to self-esteem. Children employ a wide 
range of rhetorical tools and an understanding of their functions. Speakers 
understand the power of persuasion, they support their assertions with examples, 
they use comparisons, playful language, and attempt irony (although the speaker 
calls it sarcasm), thus indicating their awareness that language is not transparent 
to meaning. This sophisticated apprehension of language often contrasts with 
their limited fluency. Sometimes their formulations border on the 
incomprehensible or appear self-contradictory (‘I think handicapped people are 
no different than we are. They’re just people that are different’). The limited 
linguistic fluency and relatively poor syntax may obfuscate but do not deny the 
children’s capacity for logical operations and reasoned responses. Children 
display inter alia their ability to classify, their understanding of the principle of 
the excluded middle, the fallacy of arguing the universal from the particular. 
Gash (1993) argued identity is involved because children’s known ideas about 
“out-groups” are the way their “in-group” expects them to think. For example, if 
a boy suddenly changes his ideas about girls or about his views on playing with 
a child with Down’s syndrome, his friends will wonder why he changed. They 
thought they knew his ideas about girls. They thought he had similar ideas to 
themselves about children with Down’s syndrome. These may well have been 
unexamined negative ideas but holding a common view gave them a sense of 
solidarity. They were different. They were not like that. So what has happened? 
Why has their friend changed? In this sense prejudices are individual 
expectations with social implications. They form part of an individual’s identity 
within the group. 
 
A group is held together by ideology (Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2014a,b; 
Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012), and it is defined by the value system that 
it considers fundamental (Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2013a,b, Usó-
Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012) and must be shared by all group members. 
The content of the EP provides a useful path, through the vehicle of language about 
values concerning particular subjects. Much of our values, our substantive beliefs 
(Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2013a,b, Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 
2012), i.e., our EP, we ascribe to a particular social group,precisely one that shares or 
from which we have received our values, now accepted as our own. A group is 
constituted as such by the nature of the EP that we share. A group becomes more 
cohesive, the most closely related though (EPF). (EPV) always refers to individual 
nuances and involves the construction of a world of values, of which some are shared, 
without prejudice to the possibility that others do not, and corresponds to a personal 
acquisition as a result of a process of individuation. By contrast, it may mean not giving 
way to other’s reasoning, require indiscriminate and undifferentiated rejection of ideas 
accepted by others, or ideas that have been provided by those who at the time perform 
the role of being the hierarchical rank of the group. In the same way (EPF) hierarchize 
the reality and insist it is necessary to accept the hierarchy of those who are carriers of 
the “eternal values”. (EPF) appeals to unsure and unsafe subjects who can only survive 
without trouble acting irrationally and doing indisputable damage to their value system. 
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They are encouraged to give substantive nature to the values, especially abstract nouns, 
in so far as they mean the "concept" that encompasses a set of specific adjectives. For 
the (EPF), beauty, goodness, justice, etc., or superiority, evil, sin, etc.., are set names for 
things, that in turn are estimated as beautiful, good, fair, etc.., or higher, bad, sinful, etc.. 
 
Example 24: There are no biological, historical, social reasons of any kind to justify the 
following false estimative propositions: 
1) Men are superior to women on account of the qualities with which God has 
gifted the one above the other, and on account of the outlay they make from their 
substance for them.  
2) The Jews are our misfortune. 
3) Blacks are an inferior race. 
4) There is no salvation outside the Church. 
5) Homosexuality is a vice. 
6) The left is morally superior. 
7) Blood ties are sacred. 
These propositions are not just anecdotes but have led to marginalization, 
discrimination, persecution, exile, torture and extermination of millions of human 
beings throughout history. 
 
Adopting group values confers, on the other hand, security that socialization implies in 
the broad sense. One is part of the group as long as one shares their values.Not sharing 
entails self-condemnation to ostracism, marginalization or, in some cases, persecution 
and even death. Repression of speech is primarily an extra-subjective process and 
secondarily lived as one’s own experience, through the appropriation of the values of 
the social and ideological group in which the subject is located. So if the group 
membership allows certain forms of speech, on the other hand, the adoption of the 
values of that group, to coexist in it, requires self-limited communication capabilities. In 
fact, the eventual exit from (if possible) the enabler-inhibitor group, in turn, makes 
possible certain forms of liberated speech (and in general of behavior), which shows the 
light repression of everyday environment. Political censorship is exercised, of course, in 
the realm of information, but value judgments are hidden. Serious political repression, 
justified from the internal logic of totalitarian systems, is a consequence of making 
judgments of valuethat cannot be tolerated in any way. This would make us wonder 
about the concept of "normality". If (EPV) requires individual responsible judgment, it 
should be easier to differ from group think. However, paranoid, obsessive, depressive, 
anxious, etc. dynamisms exist in every individual and depend on the balance or lack of 
balance between the individual and the group. That the possessors of these clinical 
conditions become ill or marginalized depends on this balance of the individual with the 
social system. Being part of the social system and internalizing the ideology of the 
system itself may provide serious conflicts for an individual who in turn may be 
considered as having such ills11. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
                                                          
11 In different cultural contexts of the West mystical systems are tolerated and respected, but are 
considered delusions or paranoid attitudes by people who overestimate real attitudes of the community. 
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While the philosophy of language has focused on questions of meaning, language use 
and the relation between language and reality, hermeneutical analysis contributes to the 
view that interpretive issues in language are paramount. We arrived at the following 
conclusions:  
 
1) Estimative EP propositions are connotative of OPs which intend to define or 
qualify, and are denotative of the speaker who aims to define and qualify the 
object with his speech EPs reflect on the speaker, who is required to verify 
connotative operations on meanings. 
2) The distinction between (EPV) and (EPF) is extremely important for human 
communication. Human communication is not comparable to what can be 
carried out, for example, by traffic signals.In these, there are only indications. 
Therefore, in subjects whose speech consists only of (OPs), their informational 
value may be high, but hardly communicative, because communication includes 
information and expression. A speech consisting entirely of OP is a speech that 
conceals. 
3) Within Freud’s and indeed Norbert Elias’s theories, civilisation is built on 
repression. Repression is seen to operate on at least two distinct levels. On one 
level individuals operate the restrictions on themselves (intra-individual 
consistency), and on the other, society orchestrates the constraints on the 
individual (inter-individual consistency). Whilst a collective cannot exist 
without a shared cultural and ideological system - which each individual will of 
course adhere to differentially - the logic of individuals submitting themselves to 
a repressive set of cultural and ideological norms is less clear (Gash & Gash,  
1999). This must be answered in terms of how the individual balances the 
importance of intra-individual and inter-individual constraints. So what do 
individuals gain from society that makes people stop acting on their impulses 
and desires? Is the “reality” principle strong enough (inter-individual 
consistency)? A tentative answer is that through allegiance to the system the 
individual accrues security from the system. This can be illustrated micro-
socially: in so far as a colectivity can live according to a set of norms and values 
(unified belief system), we can anticipate others’ behaviour and actions and 
consequentially plan and organise our own. Bauman (1997) argues that in our 
post-modern society the balance existing between the individual and society, 
between impulse and security, repression/suppression, has shifted. In a 
modernist perspective there was a greater emphasis on individuals submitting 
themselves to the dictates of the social whole. In post-modern society, it is 
argued that the balance has shifted towards a greater recognition of individual 
constructions, in other words in post-modern society there are greater capacities 
for individual freedom. Given the continual dynamic which exists between 
agency and structure, the implication of greater individual freedom (read: less 
socially imposed constraint) is greater insecurity (read: less socially negotiated 
order).  
4) The norms and values of a society are clarified and reiterated over time as it 
becomes recursively more self-aware. A symptom of modernity and of cohesive 
societies is a pursuit of order according to the dictates of the negotiated 
ideological system. The implicit pact of civility exists between agents of the 
system and requires an understanding of and adherence to this pact. This 
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assumes both that the other (a) has an understanding of the normative 
boundaries and (b) is willing to comply with them. The introduction of a 
different other, hence, can pose a challenge to agreed normative expectations. In 
other words, individuals strive to balance two types of coherences: inter-
individual consistency, maintaining a normative coherence between members of 
the group, and intra-individual consistency, where coherence is maintained 
within individuals’ own ideological systems (Gash & Gash, 1997). However, 
tolerance rates in all of these studies change as a result of increased contact with 
different others. This has been explained by the greater differentiation which 
occurs with increased contact between self and other. The ethical issue is 
whether the attitudinal change is positive. At a broader micro-social level, the 
agreed ways of interacting with others in a group may be set aside if the 
different other is recognised as such. The educational and social challenge in a 
post-modern pluralist society is to promote an ethic of mutual respect to ensure 
tolerance.  
5) The analysis of everyday speech, both in its formal aspects as those concerning 
the content, involves a more differentiated approach to penetrate the ideology of 
the speaker, and, through it, detect its assignment to groups, and their desire for 
unachieved affiliation .Despite repression imposed in these forms of speech, 
there is always some escape route by which the expressive significances emerge 
to the observer. 
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